Exploiting Smartvote Data for the Ideological Mapping of Swiss Political Parties by Germann, Micha et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2012
Exploiting Smartvote Data for the Ideological Mapping of Swiss Political
Parties
Germann, Micha; Mendez, Fernando; Serdült, Uwe
Abstract: Unspecified
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-98407
Originally published at:
Germann, Micha; Mendez, Fernando; Serdült, Uwe (2012). Exploiting Smartvote Data for the Ideological
Mapping of Swiss Political Parties. In: XXVI Convegno SISP (Società Italiana di Scienza Politica),
Università Roma Tre, Rome, 13 September 2012 - 15 September 2012.
Exploiting Smartvote Data for the Ideological 
Mapping of Swiss Political Parties
Micha Germann, Fernando Mendez, Uwe Serdult and Jonathan 
Wheatley
University of Zurich
Abstract
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Introduction§
The question of  the nature  of  the  ideological  space1 has  long been of  interest  to 
political scientists. Scholars aiming to position political parties within the political space have 
adopted a number of different methods (Mair 2001). Commonly used approaches include the 
expert survey (Castles and Mair 1984; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Benoit and Laver 2006) or 
the elite survey (Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, and Toka 1999; Warwick 2005; Hix and 
Crombez 2005).  Another widely used method,  popularized by the ECPR Party Manifesto 
Group (Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987; Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, and Bara 2001), is 
the coding of party manifestos.2
However,  it  is  notable that  most  of  the well-established methods for mapping the 
political  space  has  focused  on  the  political  elite,  i.e.  on  the  supply  side  of  political  
competition. Investigations into the political dimensionality of the demand side of electoral 
competition are remarkably smaller in number. This is unfortunate, given that the political  
dimensionality of elites is only one side of the coin. What is more, researchers interested in 
the ideological positions of the general populace so far have had only one instrument at their  
disposal: traditional surveys. In this paper, we want to explore the potential of a new data  
source for what Key (1964) has termed the “party-in-the-electorate”, namely data from so  
called Voting Advice Applications (VAAs), Internet applications designed to help users make 
an informed choice about how to vote.
§ We would like to thank Jan Fivaz and Andreas Ladner (and the smartvote team) for providing us 
with the data from 2007 on which this paper paper is based.
1  To avoid redundancy, we use the terms ideological space and political space interchangeably.
2  Research on the Swiss ideological space has made use of a series of these techniques (cf. Hug and 
Schulz  2007  for  an  excellent  overview  and  assessment  of  several  of  these  attempts).  Brändle 
(1999), for example, contributed to the literature by collecting the manifestos of major Swiss parties 
and coding them according to the rules given by the Manifesto Project. Basing on expert surveys, 
Huber and Inglehart (1995) and Benoit and Laver (2006) were able to position Swiss parties, in the 
former case on a single left-right scale and in the latter on a wider range of political dimensions.  
Kerr (1981), Ayberk, Finger, Garcia, and Sciarini (1991), and Ladner and Brändle (2001), on the 
other hand, mapped the Swiss political space by the use of elite self-placements on left-right scales. 
In  addition  to  these  well-established  methods,  political  maps  were  generated  based  on  media 
content analyses (Lachat 2008; Kriesi et al. 2006), partisan voting recommendations in referendum 
votes (Hug and Schulz 2007), parliamentary roll-call votes (Jeitziner and Hohl 1997; Hermann, 
Leuthold, and Kriesi 1999; Hug and Schulz 2007), or on communal votes on referendum proposals 
(Hermann and Leuthold 2003; Leuthold, Hermann, and Fabrikant 2007).
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VAAs have become very popular in a number of European countries over the last few 
years,  and increasingly also overseas. Given their  deployment in the immediate run-up to 
elections, VAAs usually attract a considerable number of visitors, and thus generate a large 
dataset that includes the stated political preferences of citizens. As most VAAs also include a 
number  of  supplementary  questions  on  party  affiliation  and  vote  intention,  this  extra 
information can help researchers to identify and map the ideological positions of VAAs users 
who  support certain political parties or candidates.
The use of VAAs as a data-generating tool for mapping party supporters has a number 
of advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, the generally much higher number of 
observations VAA data sets include compared to classic telephone surveys allows researchers 
to  explore  subsets  of  data  (for  example  regional  subsets).  Second,  when  compared  to 
telephone surveys, the anonymous format of a VAA may render respondents more likely to 
reveal their true preferences. Third, the use of VAA data for mapping purposes is relatively 
cost-free. Finally, VAA data allows a comparison of the ideological positions of rank-and-file 
party supporters with those of the political elite using the same data source. In particular, the 
VAA from which we will draw our data in this paper, the Swiss smartvote, includes self-
coding by candidates. This offers us the chance to compare the ideological positions of party 
supporters with those of their party's candidates.
The main disadvantage of using VAA data is that users self-select into the sample. We 
thus have to tackle the question of whether the resulting lack of representativeness effectively 
precludes any valid inferences. However, by comparing our VAA data-based findings with 
findings based on more established methods (for example, telephone surveys) we can at least 
explore whether our method produces comparable results to those based on a (supposedly) 
more representative sample.
The paper is structured as follows. We first briefly discuss the results of previous 
studies on the nature of the political space. In the following section, we outline in more detail  
the pros and cons of VAA data for mapping the grass-roots party supporters, and then provide 
a  short  description  of  the  tool  we  use  as  a  data  generator:  smartvote.  After  a  critical  
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assessment of the scalability of the two dimensions smartvote itself has offered, we apply a  
combination of inductive techniques to identify homogeneous measures of the latent political 
dimensions  underlying  the  Swiss  political  space.  The  political  map  we  derive  is  then 
compared to an analogous map based on a representative survey. In the final sections, we will  
then use the VAA-based map to investigate additional aspects,  in particular the elite-mass  
ideological relationship, and compare our findings to previous investigations. We conclude 
with a discussion of the usefulness of VAA data for mapping the party-in-the-electorate.
The Nature of the Political Space
In their seminal work, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) described the historical European 
political  space  as  structured  by  four  basic  cleavages  –  the  center/periphery,  religious, 
rural/urban, and owner/worker divide. Over time, these four cleavages came down to two in 
most countries: an economic one, dividing the pro-state left from the pro-market right, and a  
cultural  one,  dividing  believing  Catholics,  believing  Protestants,  and/or  the  secularized 
(Lipset  and  Rokkan  1967;  Kriesi,  Grande,  Lachat,  Dolezal,  Bornschier,  and  Frey  2006). 
However, mainly as a result of secularization, political competition after the Second World 
War was largely driven by economic issues, such as the development of the welfare state,  
economic redistribution, taxation, and government regulation of the economy (Bartolini and 
Mair 1990). Nevertheless, cultural issues have always remained salient, if only to a lesser  
degree.
However,  with  the  improvement  in  standards  of  living,  the  rise  of  new  social 
movements,  and  the  collapse  of  communism,  the  cultural  dimension  seemed  to  regain 
strength (Inglehart  1977;  Kitschelt  1988)  and in  many places  even became the dominant 
source of party competition during the last decades to the twentieth century. This increase in  
salience was accompanied by a continuous transformation (or reinterpretation) of the original 
meaning of the cultural axis (Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi et al. 2006). While originally concerned 
with religious questions only, the cultural cleavage has come to be associated with a broad set 
of non-economic issues, including attitudes towards immigration, environmental protection, 
and  governmental  authority.  In  particular,  Kriesi  et  al.  (2006)  argue  that  the  process  of 
4
globalisation has led to the integration of issues such as immigration and EU membership into 
the pre-existing cultural cleavage. The structure of this cultural dimension varies considerably 
when compared cross-nationally. In some countries, it may refer, in part at least, to ecological  
concerns, in others it is oriented around traditionalism, and in still others the most salient non-
economic conflicts pertain to questions of immigration and national sovereignty. It is because 
of this convergence of different issues that the cultural axis has been renamed the Gal/Tan  
dimension,  with  Gal  representing  green,  alternative,  and  libertarian  values,  and  Tan 
representing traditionalism, authority, and nationalism (Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, and Edwards 
2006). Alternatively, Kriesi and Trechsel (2008) refer to the fundamental inherent conflict as 
cultural liberalism versus conservatism.
The Use of VAA Data for Mapping the Electoral Political Space
Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) are online applications that are typically launched 
shortly before landmark elections. They typically consist of at least thirty policy statements  
on which the the positions of parties or candidates have been coded,  either by academic 
experts or by the parties and/or candidates themselves. Users provide their opinions, typically  
with respect  to a four-  or  five-category Likert  scale ranging from complete agreement to  
complete  disagreement.  The  system  then  produces  a  rank  ordering  of  candidates/parties  
according  to  the  degree  of  overlap  with  the  user's  preferences.  Many  VAAs also  collect 
supplementary data on users, such as their age, sex, educational attainments, religion, region,  
vote intention and party affiliation. 
So far, VAA literature has mainly dealt with technical issues related to VAA design,  
such as statement selection (Walgrave Nuytemans, and Pepermans 2009; Lobo, Vink, and Lisi 
2010),  the coding of  party positions  (Trechsel  and Mair  2011),  or  the effect  of  different  
matching  techniques  on the resulting  party rankings  (Louwerse  and Rosema 2011).  Only 
recently have scholars started to pose questions with a somewhat broader relevance, including 
the impact of VAAs on voting behavior, participation, and voter turnout (Garzia 2010; Ladner,  
Felder,  and  Fivaz  2010;  Fivaz  and  Nadig  2010)  or  the  extent  to  which  MPs  keep  their 
promises made in election campaigns (Schwarz, Schädel, and Ladner 2011). However, the use 
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of the VAA as a tool to generate data from its users has been more limited. In particular, VAA 
data has not been extensively used for mapping the political space, the only exceptions being  
Kleinnijenhuis and Krouwel  (2009),  Talonen and Sulkava (2011),  and Wheatley,  Carman, 
Mendez, and Mitchell (2012). It is this gap that the paper intends to fill.
Many  VAAs  map  parties  or  candidates  on  a  multi-dimensional  scale  based  on  a 
number of salient policy dimensions. The logic of this method is to exploit the self-defined 
localizations  of  parties  or  candidates  on  multiple  political  issues  and  aggregate  them to 
measures of political dimensionality. Put differently, what we are essentially engaging in is an 
exercise in latent variable modeling, whereby an individual’s observed preferences on some 
policy issues are treated as correlates of some latent, i.e., unobservable, ideological dimension 
(Converse 1964). In principle, there are two basic approaches to this problem (Benoit and 
Laver 2012). Following a deductive logic, we can a priori define which items form a political  
dimension,  for  example,  economic  left-right.  Alternatively,  we  can  a  posteriori  employ 
inductive techniques to identify latent dimensions. Drawing on a written survey, Leimgruber 
et al. (2010) have recently employed such an inductive method to compare the ideological  
positions of Swiss voters and politicians.
Compared  to  the  traditional  instrument  for  inferring  rank-and-file  ideological 
positions, in particular the telephone survey, the main upside of VAAs is the wealth of data 
they generally produce, notably in the immediate run-up to elections and thus at a time when 
party competition is at its height. In contrast, analyses based on telephone survey data are 
often plagued by the naturally rather limited number of items they can use. Furthermore, the  
format of a VAA, in particular the absence of an interviewer may render respondents more 
likely to reveal their true preferences compared to a telephone survey. It is commonly known, 
for  example,  that  it  is  difficult  to  elicit  racist  opinions  in  telephone  surveys.  Another  
beneficial feature of VAA data is that it allows for comparisons of the ideological positions of  
rank-and-file party supporters and the political elite using the same data source. The matching 
technique of a VAA makes it necessary to code the positions of parties and/or candidates on 
the  same policy  issues  users  have  to  answer.  This  coding  is  either  done  by  independent 
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experts or by the parties/candidates themselves (or a combination thereof). Assuming these 
codings  are  reasonable,  these  pre-coded  elite  policy  stances  can  be  used  for  direct 
comparisons  with  the  non-elite.  Meanwhile,  most  existing  studies  aiming  to  make  such 
comparisons draw on different data and methods for the demand and the supply side – and are 
thus  naturally  limited.  Finally,  a  not  insignificant  merit  concerns  money.  In  contrast  to 
representative surveys, data generation is not the sole purpose of VAAs. VAAs are conducted  
for various purposes, including the provision of political information and civic education, so 
we do not have to set up a VAA just for data generation. In many countries, the data exists 
anyway; hence it creates no extra costs when we use it to investigate political dimensionality.
However,  due  to  the  fact  that  respondents  self-select  into  the  sample,  VAA data 
obviously has a problem with representativity (Pianzola/Ladner 2011). An obvious response 
to this problem is a rigorous weighting strategy, but we believe that weighting is unlikely to 
lead  to  the  desired  results,  at  least  for  the  time  being.  This  is  because  of  the  fact  that 
weighting does not make much sense if the respondents belonging to a group to which we 
want to give additional weight are not representative of this particular group; and this is, for 
now, often the case when dealing with VAA data.  Consider,  for  example,  the quite small  
number of badly educated, rural pensioners with low income that fills in a VAA – these will 
often be rather atypical of their group. Giving them additional weight is thus likely to add 
additional bias.3 Moreover the method we use in this paper to identify unidimensional scales, 
Mokken Scale Analysis, cannot be applied to weighted data samples, so weighting also limits 
the analytic tools that we have at our disposal for extracting meaningful latent dimensions.
Another alternative would be to randomly sample our dataset in order to extract a 
smaller sample that replicates the voting population at large in terms of vote intention and 
then  to  repeat  the  same  analytic  procedures  on  the  new sample.  Such  an  approach  was 
recently used to explore the policy space generated by users of the Scottish Vote Compass, a 
VAA deployed prior to the 2011 Holyrood elections in Scotland (Wheatley, Carman, Mendez, 
3 Meanwhile,  one  might  add  that  surveys  also  have problems with  self-selection.  This  concerns 
written surveys in particular, which formed the basis for Leimgruber et al’s (2010) comparison of 
voters and candidates.
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and Mitchell 2012). Applying the same methodologies of dimension extraction as used in this 
paper  to  i)  the  complete  (clean)  dataset  of  Scottish  VAA users,  and  ii)  to  the  smaller,  
politically representative sample,  produced almost  identical  results.  This suggests that  our 
methods for dimension extraction are really rather robust and the lack of representativeness of 
our sample may, in fact, not prove a major obstacle for the type of analysis we are using.4
Overall, we believe that the representativity problem does not necessarily preclude 
the usage of VAA data to map the demand side of the political space. Another reason for our  
confidence lies in the fact that the demand side arguably is not determined by the public at 
large,  but by a smaller subset of  politically informed and interested citizens, in particular 
those that actually cast their vote. In Switzerland, where turnout in federal elections regularly  
fails to reach 50%, this is a relatively exclusive share of the total population. What we thus  
ideally need in order to map the “party-in-the-electorate” is a representative sample of actual  
voters. Needless to say that VAA data cannot achieve this, but neither can its main competitor,  
i.e., survey data. Due to social desirability bias, it is often next to impossible to identify true  
voters  in  surveys.5 However,  somehow  paradoxically  when  considering  their  purported 
function, VAAs in general and smartvote in particular are accessed disproportionately often 
by well-educated, young and middle-aged voters (Ladner, Felder, and Fivaz 2010). The self-
selection mechanism thus guarantees a rich, if not fully representative, sample of politically 
informed respondents who regularly cast their vote. 
Smartvote
Since its launch in 2003, the Swiss VAA smartvote was offered to Swiss voters in the 
run-up to a series of national, cantonal, and local elections. The 2007 version (that we will use 
as data source) was designed for elections to the national parliament and, as usual, presented 
users with a personal political profile based on their responses to a battery of up to 73 items. 
These  items  either  took the  form of  general  policy  statements,  which  made  up  the  vast  
4 It is the authors' intention to attempt this analysis also on the dataset that is the subject of this paper.
5 For instance, in a national survey conducted in Switzerland in 2007 (SELECTS 2007), roughly 69% 
of the respondents claimed to have voted in the federal elections, whereas the actual turnout rate  
was 48.9%.
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majority of items (i.e., 63 out of 73), or of questions on government spending (the remaining  
ten).  While  users  faced  a  choice  between  four  answer  categories  in  case  of  the  policy  
statements (“yes”, “rather yes”, “rather no”, and “no”), they could choose among three answer 
categories  only  in  case  of  the  spending questions  (“less”,  “no  change”,  and  “more”).  In 
addition, users had the option of giving a “no opinion” and of weighting their responses. 
Finally, smartvote users were given the option of filling in an opt-in survey which asked for 
supplementary  information  including  age,  sex,  education,  income,  religion,  canton,  vote 
intention  and  voting  behaviour  in  previous  elections.  Meanwhile,  all  candidates  in  the 
parliamentary  elections  had  previously  been  asked  to  fill  in  the  same  questionnaire.  A 
remarkable 85% of all candidates made use of this possibility (Fivaz and Nadig 2010). After 
completion  of  the  questionnaire,  user  responses  were  matched  with  the  responses  from 
candidates. The matching system works by assigning congruence values to each question for  
each  candidate  (Thurman and Gasser  2009).  In  the ensuing  ranking  of  highest  to  lowest  
congruence (the “voting recommendation” in smartvote terminology), users could compare 
themselves with both single candidates and party lists. In the latter case, the matching was  
based on the median value of the responses of all candidates on a list. 
In addition to the ranking of congruence values, the website allowed users to visually 
compare  their  political  preferences  with  those  of  candidates.  One  of  the  graphic 
visualizations, the so called smartmap, could be of particular interest for our purposes. The 
smartmap allowed users to compare their  placement on a two-dimensional  political  space 
with that of candidates and/or party lists. More specifically, smartvote assigned up to 65 out 
of the 73 items to one, or, in at least some cases, even both dimensions. The assignment of the  
items was based on previous research (Hermann and Leuthold 2003; Leuthold et al. 2007)  
which defined the Swiss ideological space as consisting of two orthogonal dimensions, in  
particular  a left-right  and a liberal-conservative cleavage.  As a matter of course, it  would  
simplify our exercise considerably if  we used these ex-ante defined Likert scales, but  we 
should not do so without an assessment of their scalability.
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Examining the Ex-ante Defined Scales
Our examination of the a priori defined dimensions will be based on original user 
answers. However, our analysis will be restricted to those users who filled in the additional 
opt-in  survey.  This  is  done  for  two  reasons.  First,  the  opt-in  survey  contains  additional 
information which we will need to map the positions of grass-roots party supporters. Second,  
and  even  more  important,  by  considering  only  those  users  that  provided  the  additional 
information, we automatically get a cleaned dataset. Many users used the tool more than once 
(Thurman and Gasser 2009) and many, as is usually the case with VAAs, may just have been 
experimenting with it.  Unfortunately,  the 2007 version of smartvote did not  make use of  
techniques, such as time stamps or saving IP addresses, which would enable us to filter out 
potential  “bogus”  entries.  Hence,  the  only  way to  avoid  invalid  entries  is  to  restrict  our 
analysis to those completing the opt-in survey, where a) it can reasonably be expected that  
experimenting users did not take part and b) that only the first and probably most sincere  
entry of those using the tool more than once was stored.
Based on the information that has been provided by the smartvote team, we were able 
to fully replicate the two original smartvote scales. However, in our analysis, we will leave 
out the spending questions and thus not consider the full set of 73 items.6 We do this for three 
reasons.  On the one hand,  there are only three answer categories in case of the spending  
questions, compared to four for the policy statements. Including the spending questions would 
hence necessitate the creation of a by definition empty middle category for the vast majority  
of items – a relatively questionable endeavor. On the other hand, asking respondents about 
spending preferences without presenting a trade-off is often considered to lead to inconsistent 
answers (Hansen 1998; Gemenis 2012).7 Who, for instance, does not want to spend more on 
education? And in fact, several of the spending questions are highly skewed and thus do a bad 
job at discriminating between political attitudes.8
6 The basic implications of the assessment of the scalability of the ex-ante defined scales remain the 
same if all items are included. The results including all items can be obtained upon request.
7 The problem with spending questions runs even deeper, as the presentation of a trade-off leads to 
double-barreled questions, which can also be problematic (cf. Gemenis 2012).
8 Dropping the spending questions still leaves us with 63 items and 7,887 complete entries, while the 
Pearson's correlation coefficient with the scales including the spending questions is roughly .99 for  
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Let  us  proceed  to  the  assessment  of  the  two  ex-ante  defined  dimensions.  When 
confronted with Likert scales, it is common practice to check scale reliability using a split-
half test, such as Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach 1951). In order to be considered reliable, the 
alpha score of a given scale needs to exceed .7. It is accordingly a good sign in terms of split-
half reliability that the Cronbach’s alphas for the smartvote left-right and liberal-conservative 
axes equal .88 and .78, respectively.
Yet,  a reliable measure is not always valid. The most important requirement for a 
scale to be considered valid is internal consistency, i.e., the items that form a scale need all be  
measures of the same latent trait (van Schuur 2003). In order to assess whether the smartvote  
scales  can  be  considered  unidimensional  (or  homogeneous),  as  a  first  step  we  apply  a  
graphical technique that, while not a formal test, allows for an intuitive investigation of a  
scale’s internal consistency. The approach builds on the central assumption that each item of a 
Likert scale is an ordinal-level function of the latent trait this scale aims to measure. It follows  
that if a Likert scale in fact measures a single common latent variable (and is thus internally 
consistent), each item must be monotonically related to all other items (Jacoby 1991). This  
means that, as the score of the latent trait increases, so should the score of each single item, 
and vice  versa.  Whether  there  are  in  fact  such  monotone  relationships  can  be  examined  
graphically by plotting each single item of a scale against the sum of all remaining items (i.e.,  
the  restscore),  using  locally  adjusted  (lowess)  regression  curves  (for  a  more  detailed 
description  of  this  approach  cf.  Dinas  and  Gemenis  2010).9 A scale  can  be  considered 
internally  consistent  if  the  lowess  curve  of  each  item  increases  monotonically  with  the  
restscore. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the respective plots for the ex-ante defined left-right and liberal-
conservative scales, respectively. It becomes immediately obvious that both scales suffer from 
internal heterogeneity. In particular, at least three out of the 30 items forming the left-right  
scale (10, 32, and 52) are clearly not monotonically increasing with the restscores, while in 
both the left-right and the liberal-conservative dimensions.
9 We use locally adjusted regression instead of item-rest correlations because there needs not be a 
linear relationship between a specific item and the latent trait.
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case of the liberal-conservative axis, even ten out of the 31 items clearly have no monotone  
relationship with the latent trait (6, 9, 11, 17, 24, 25, 33, 37, 44, and 46). Part of the reason for 
the  apparent  problems  with  homogeneity  may  be  smartvote’s  rather  uncommon 
conceptualization of the two ideological axes, which goes back to earlier empirical work by 
Hermann  and  Leuthold  (2003)  and  Leuthold  et  al.  (2007).  Specifically,  the  left-right 
dimension includes not only, as one would expect, items referring to the classic economic 
cleavage, but also some concerning law and order (e.g., item 51: “do you believe toughening 
the criminal law for juveniles is the proper way to halt youth crime?”) as well as some on 
military defense (e.g., item 52: “do you support the deployment of the army in a support role 
to ensure internal security (WEF, EURO 2008, guarding embassies and consulates)?”). On the 
other hand, the liberal-conservative axis, while containing a series of items on cultural and 
political openness, immigration, or the army – issues that are commonly attributed to a GAL-
TAN dimension – also includes items on liberalism in the economic sense (e.g., item 33: “do  
you support a minimum wage of 3,500 francs (for a full-time position) for all employees?”).  
Particularly with regard to the second dimension10, this conflation of economic with GAL-
TAN items  seems  the  most  important  source  of  the  problems  with  internal  consistency: 
depending on one’s interpretation, at least three, but possibly even six out of the ten items that 
clearly have no monotone relationship with the latent trait deal with economic issues (24, 33, 
37, and possibly 6, 44, and 46).11
(Figures 1 & 2 about here)
Identifying and Measuring the Latent Political Dimensions
Having established the problematic nature of the ex-ante defined scales in terms of 
internal validity, we face a choice among two options: a) refining the ex-ante assignment of  
items in such a way that it better reflects the common interpretations of left-right and liberal-
10  Meanwhile,  at  least  one out of the three problematic items on the left-right dimension clearly  
pertains to a non-economic issue, namely to the army (52). 
11  In the more recent 2011 version, smartvote used an inductive technique called correspondence 
analysis to back up their political map. Nonetheless, the short methodological description (which 
can be found on the smartvote website) suggests that  the smartvote scales continue to conflate  
economic and non-economic issues. It would thus be interesting to put the new scales to a similar 
test for internal consistency.
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conservative  and  subsequently  reassessing  the  new  scales,  or  b)  switching  to  ex-post,  
inductive  techniques  of  dimensionality  analysis  and  scale  construction.  For  the  present  
purpose,  we will  follow the latter  approach.  As the very nature of an inductive approach  
implies that we do not make any a priori assumptions about the dimensionality of the political 
space, the key challenge of this inductive scaling exercise lies in the identification of the  
number and substance of the latent dimensions (Benoit and Laver 2012). 
To get a first feel for the dimensionality of the political space, we apply exploratory 
factor analysis (Thurstone 1947). Compared to other popular latent variable techniques, factor 
analysis seems advantageous as it allows for a relatively straightforward identification and 
labeling of latent dimensions. We base the factor analysis on polychoric correlations to do 
justice  to  the  ordinal  nature  of  the  smartvote  items.  A total  of  7,887  entries,  from   all  
smartvote users (not candidates) with complete answer sets to all 63 policy questions, are 
included. As a first step, we need to establish the number of dimensions in the political space,  
i.e.,  in  methodological  language,  the number  of  factors  to  retain for  rotation.  A common 
practice  is  to  employ the Kaiser  criterion and to extract  all  factors  where the amount  of 
explained variance (the Eigenvalue) exceeds one. However, there exists broad consensus in 
the methodological literature that the application of the Kaiser criterion is inadvisable as it  
often leads to the extraction of too many factors (Velicer and Jackson 1990).12 Thus, we use 
the scree test, which involves an examination of the graph of the eigenvalues against their 
serial order (Figure 3). We are looking for the so-called “elbow”, i.e., the break point in the 
data after which the curve flattens out, and then keep the number of factors above the elbow 
(Costello  and Osborne 2005).  The screeplot  suggests  that  this  break happens at  the third 
factor, and thus that the Swiss political space is best described as two-dimensional.13 
(Figure 3 about here)
Table  1  shows  the  respective  two-dimensional  orthogonal  varimax  rotated  factor 
loadings matrix  on each of  the 63 issue statements.  The rotation aims at  simplifying the 
12   In the present case, the Kaiser criterion would suggest to extract six factors.
13  However, we nonetheless tested three- and four-dimensional solutions as well. Both the three- and 
the four-dimensional solutions lead to rather messy factor structures with lots of crossloadings and 
substantially meaningless extra dimensions.
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interpretation.14 Compared  to  the  ex-ante  defined  dimensions,  the  extracted  factors  more 
closely  resemble  the  common  conception  of  the  ideological  space  of  a  West  European 
country. The bulk of the items with strong loadings (>.4) on the first factor refers to what we  
will  call  the  cultural  or  the  social  liberalism-conservatism  divide,  including  items  on 
immigration (13-17), cultural liberalism and traditionalism (6, 18, 19, 20, 25), law and order 
(9, 51, 58), the army (53, 55, 57), political and economic integration (60-63), and democratic  
reform (50). On the other hand, the items with strong loadings on the second dimension can 
mostly  be  attributed  to  the  classic  economic  left-right  cleavage,  including  in  particular 
questions on the welfare state (1, 2, 3, 7), economic liberalism (23, 24, 33, 34, 36-39), as well 
as on budget and taxes (27, 28, 31). Meanwhile, it is noticeable that most of the items with a  
reference to environmental protection either have strong crossloadings (41, 43-45, 47) or are 
attributed to the economic dimension (11, 46). Only one environmental item dealing with the 
introduction of road pricing (40) clearly loads on the cultural dimension. It seems thus that  
ecological issues are not clearly affiliated with the cultural dimension in Switzerland, contrary 
to many other European countries (Marks et al. 2006). Rather, the high number of ambiguous 
items suggests that ecology runs along the diagonal of the political space, meaning that the  
continuum of support for environmental protection ranges from right-conservatives (the no 
side) to left-libertarians (the yes side),  effectively mirroring the conflict line suggested by 
Kitschelt (1994). There are, however, also a few items with strong crossloadings that have no 
reference to ecology (in particular 7, 8, 31, 35, and 39).15 A final thing to note is the very 
considerable uniqueness values of roughly a third out of the 63 items, which indicates that 
these variables probably do not belong with any of the two dimensions. We may, in other  
words, be better off not including these variables in the measurement of either left-right or  
14  While  the  orthogonal  varimax  rotation  applied  here  assumes  that  the  extracted  factors  are 
independent,  many  suggest  using  oblique  rotations  to  allow  for  some correlation  between  the 
factors. However, an oblique promax rotation produces essentially the same results, which suggests 
that we are in fact confronted with two nearly independent dimensions, which can subsequently be 
treated as independent. 
15  The crossloadings make sense on substantial grounds in at least some of the cases. Consider, for 
instance, item 39 (public contracts should favor Swiss companies), which can be seen from both a 
standpoint of economic liberalism (i.e., minimizing governmental interventions into the economy) 
as well as from one of demarcation. Similarly, the weakly crossloaded item 6 (subsidizing daycare 
centers) can be seen through the eyes of both support for a built out welfare state and resistance  
against the modern way of life (i.e., traditionalism).
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liberal-conservative scales. The fact that most of these were part of the ex-ante defined scales  
could well constitute an additional reason for them to suffer from internal inconsistency. In  
sum, the factor analysis confirms our skepticism against the conflation of economic and non-
economic issues in the ex-ante defined smartvote scales. Not one of the economic items that 
were  ex-ante  assigned  to  the  cultural  axis  seems  to  have  a  clear  association  with  it.  
Conversely, none of the military defense or law and order items that were attributed to the 
economic cleavage actually seem to fit this dimension.
(Table 1 about here)
A straightforward strategy would now be to directly use the information we have 
gained for mapping the Swiss ideological space by calculating the factor scores for each of  
the two dimensions. However, this approach is problematic due to the different frequency 
distribution  of  the  various  items,  which points  to  a  hierarchical  relationship  amongst  the 
items.  To give an example,  item 60 ,  which refers  to  EU accession (mean = 2.69),  is  a 
considerably  more  difficult  item  in  terms  of  social  liberalism  than  item  53,  which  is 
concerned with the free choice between military and civilian service (mean = 1.53). In other  
words, a considerably higher level of social liberalism is needed to agree on EU membership  
compared to the free choice between military and civilian service.16 Factor analysis, however, 
requires that the items have the same frequency distribution (van Schuur 2003). 
In order to select items into unidimensional scales, we thus complement our analysis 
with a technique out of the repertoire of item response theory (IRT): Mokken scale analysis 
(Mokken 1971). The Mokken model is a probabilistic expansion and improvement upon the 
deterministic  Guttman  scale.  While  originally  developed  for  dichotomous  items,  the 
procedure has been extended to ordered polytomous items (Molenaar 1991). Compared to 
other  forms of  IRT,  such as  the more commonly known Rasch model  (Rasch 1960),  the 
Mokken model has the significant advantage of imposing less rigorous assumptions on the 
relation between single items and the latent trait. In particular, the only assumption in this 
16  This implies a) that a moderately socially liberal person, while relatively likely to favor the free  
choice between military and civilian service, is considerably less likely to agree on EU membership 
(60), b) that the reverse is rather unlikely, and c) that at the same time, a person with strong social  
liberal attitudes tends to agree on both.
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regard is that there is a monotone relationship (Gerich 2001).17 The Mokken scaling procedure 
can basically be described as a stepwise bottom-up search procedure for indicators of the  
same  latent  trait,  whereby  the  selection  of  items  into  unidimensional  scales  relies  on 
Loevinger’s H coefficient  of  homogeneity (van Schuur 2003).  The first  step consists  of  a 
search for the best  smallest  scale,  meaning that  out  of  a set of items,  those two with the 
highest degree of homogeneity in terms of Loevinger’s H are selected. To be considered a  
Mokken scale, the coefficient has to exceed a pre-defined threshold value c of at least .3. In  
the second step, the next best fitting item will be selected into the scale. Again, the item-
specific H has to exceed at least .3. The second step is then iterated until no new item can be 
selected that satisfies the pre-specified lower boundary. According to a rule of thumb, the 
resulting scales are considered weak if H ≥ .3, of average strength if H ≥ .4, and strong if H 
≥ .5.
Since the Mokken procedure requires that all components of a latent trait point in the 
same direction,  we  included all  items  both  in  original  and  reversed  order.  However,  we 
excluded all ambiguous items, i.e., items that are attributable to more than one latent trait. 18 
The reason for this lies in the nature of the Mokken scaling procedure, which will,  if  the  
chosen threshold value is met, attribute ambiguous items to whatever scale is constructed first  
–  and  thus  naturally  neglect  that  they  could  also  be  part  of  another,  later  formed scale.  
Leaving out the ambiguous items should accordingly minimize threats to internal consistency. 
The results of the Mokken scale analysis can be gleaned from table 2. The slightly 
reduced number of items results in a modest increase of complete entries (N = 8,188). The  
scaling procedure yields eight scales when we set the lower boundary at .3. Contrary to the 
findings from the factor analysis, this suggests that there are more than two latent dimensions. 
However, while the two longest scales, the first and the third, can be seen as reduced, but still 
17  While the Mokken model is often used in psychological studies, applications in political science 
are  comparatively  rare.  Examples  include  Cingranelli  and  Richards  (1999),  and  Jacoby (1994, 
1995). Compare Gemenis (2012) or Wheatley et al. (2012) for recent examples in the context of 
VAAs.
18  We considered an item ambiguous if it was clearly related to both latent traits in the factor analysis 
(7, 8, 31, 35, 41, 43, 44, 45, and 47). In addition, we excluded item 6 and 15 because additional  
analyses (results of which can be obtained upon request) suggested that they are attributable to both 
final scales.
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representative  versions  of  the  previously  extracted  factors,  the  remaining  –  smaller  – 
dimensions  all  include items  on  some aspect  of  the cultural  and  the economic cleavage,  
respectively.  Notably,  these particular  aspects  are  all  –  albeit  in  different  form – already  
included in the bigger first and third scales. For instance, the second scale includes items on  
cultural liberalism (e.g., abortion or gay adoption), an aspect of the cultural divide that is also  
part of the longer first scale (item 19 referring to the ban of minarets). On the other hand, the  
fourth scale deals exclusively with attitudes on state interventions into the economy, while  
some of the items on state  interventionism were at  the same time attributed to  the more 
inclusive third scale (e.g., introduction of minimum wage).19 The additional dimensions are 
hence somewhat hard to interpret and seem to add nothing substantially new. What is more,  
all except one of the additional dimensions diminish if we increase the lower boundary to .4.20 
We believe that the additional scales should thus be discarded.
(Table 2 about here)
For  further  analysis,  we  will  rely  only  on  the  largest  scales  based  on  the  higher 
threshold value (scales 1 and 3).  This way, we get  rid of the borderline items which just 
marginally meet the lower threshold. Both scales can be considered reliable in terms of split-
half reliability – the Cronbach’s alpha for the economic dimension is .77, while the alpha for  
the cultural dimension is .88. Substantially, the two resulting dimensions – despite of their  
reduced size – correspond to the two factors we extracted out of factor analysis. As before,  
they closely resemble the usual conception of political dimensionality (cf. Marks et al. 2006; 
Kriesi et al. 2006) in particular of Switzerland (cf. Lachat 2008; Leimgruber et al. 2010).  The 
economic left-right dimension, on the one hand, includes items on the welfare state (2), on 
state interventions into the economy (23, 33, and 38), and on taxation (27). On the other hand,  
the social liberalism-conservatism dimension contains items on immigration (13, 14, 16, and 
17), national sovereignty and foreign policy (60, 61, 62), on law and order (51, and 58), on  
19  Moreover, the fifth represents a mix out of governmental authority and environmental protection, 
the  seventh  refers  to  institutional  reform,  and  the  eight  to  environmental  protection,  broadly 
conceived. The sixth scale deals with the relationship of the national to the international economy. 
20  However, item 55 and 57, previously part of the first scale, now form their own scale. Again, we 
cannot see anything substantial added by this additional two-item scale.
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the army (53), and on cultural liberalism (19). It is noticeable that in terms of the number of  
items included, questions of immigration policy and political openness dominate the cultural 
axis. However, this should hardly surprise observers of Swiss politics.
The two final scales were constructed by adding up the product of the item values and 
their  item-specific weight.  The weights represent the regression scores that  were obtained  
through  two  separate  polychoric  factor  analyses  (cf.  table  3).  The  social  liberalism-
conservatism axis was reversed to facilitate the interpretation of the maps. Both scales were 
rescaled so that they range from 0 to 1.
(Table 3 about here)
Mapping the “Party-in-the-electorate”
We can  now use  the  two  unidimensional  scales  to  map  the  positioning  of  party 
supporters within the ideological space by calculating their positions with respect to the two 
scales. Party supporters are identified as those who declared an intention to vote for―or have 
already voted for―these parties in the opt-in survey.21 We focus on the five biggest parties in 
Switzerland: the People’s Democratic Party (SVP), the Social Democrats (SP), the Liberals 
(FDP), the Christian Democrats (CVP), and the Greens (GPS). Figure 4 shows the party-
specific means of party supporters along with the standard deviation on the two respective 
dimensions. We begin our discussion with the average positions of party supporters. In the 
upper-left corner, we find the supporters of SP and GPS. Their positions hardly differ. On the 
economic side, supporters of both parties have a distinctly left-leaning attitude. In particular, 
they tend to agree on an expansion of the welfare state and at the same time take a strong 
stance against economic liberalism by favoring, for instance, the introduction of a general 
minimum wage. On the cultural side, SP and GPS supporters can be described as socially  
liberal. Generally, they favor increased efforts at integration of immigrants as well as political 
openness and policies directed at cultural liberalism. At the other extreme end of the political  
21  As there was both a pre- and a post-election survey, a user is considered a party supporter if she or  
he indicated their intention to vote for one of these five parties in 2007 or if she or he indicated to 
have actually voted for one of them. Note that some users took part in both surveys. We left out  
those who made contradictory indications. For all five parties, the number of supporters we could 
consider is > 1,000.
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space, we find the SVP supporters in the lower-right corner. SVP supporters tend to combine 
an economically rightist view with a strong social conservatism. There is, for example, near  
consensus among SVP supporters on refusal of EU membership and broad agreement on a 
tough stance against both immigrants and criminals. FDP supporters roughly share the rightist  
position  of  the  SVP supporters  in  economic terms,  but  have a  slightly more  pronounced 
economically liberal view. On the cultural dimension, FDP supporters take a centrist stance  
and are in this respect close to the CVP supporters. CVP supporters, however, take a middle 
position not only on the cultural dimension, but on the economic dimension as well. Overall,  
the demand side of the Swiss political space seems determined by three different poles, a left-
liberal pole composed of SP and GPS, a right-liberal pole consisting of the FDP, and a right-
conservative pole comprised of the SVP. CVP supporters lie in the middle.
(Figure 4 about here)
Let us now turn to the issue of intra-party ideological cohesion. We investigate intra-
party ideological coherence by comparing the standard deviations of each group of policy 
supporters with respect to the two respective dimensions, represented by an ellipse around the 
average party supporter position (see Figure 4). A close look at the figures suggests, first, that  
the  ideological  consensus  seems  highest  among  the  supporters  of  the  left-liberal  parties.  
Conversely,  CVP and  FDP supporters  are  quite  divided  in  ideological  terms.  Together, 
supporters  of  these parties  seem to cover  a  substantial  part  of  the ideological  ground in-
between the  left-liberal  and  the  right-conservative  poles.  Meanwhile,  the  ellipses  show a 
considerable overlap, indicating that the ideological standing of a left-wing FDP and a right-
wing CVP supporter largely coincides. The most interesting pattern, however, can be found 
for  the  SVP.  Supporters  of  the  right-conservative  party  seem  to  have  a  high  degree  of 
convergence  on  cultural  aspects  only,  while  they  are  highly  divided  on  the  economic 
dimension. In fact, the standard deviation of SVP supporters is the lowest of all five on the y-
axis, but the highest on the x-axis. This leads to the conclusion that there are two types of 
SVP supporters. On the one hand, there are those with preferences according to Kitschelt’s 
“winning  formula”  (Kitschelt  and  McGann  1995),  i.e.,  supporters  combining  strong 
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preferences for demarcation and neoliberal economic policies. On the other hand, there are 
those  who,  while  sharing  the  distinct  socially  conservative  view,  prefer  more  moderate 
economic policies. Most interestingly, a closer inspection of the data reveals that an SVP 
supporter’s position on the economic axis is correlated with income and education: the higher 
education and income, the clearer pro-market are the views of an SVP supporter. 
What about External Validity? Comparing the VAA-based Map to a Survey-
based Map
As has already been outlined, the most fundamental problem in using VAA data to 
draw maps of the demand side political dimensionality is the lack of representativity. In this 
section,  we  address  the question of  whether  and,  if  so,  how the representativity  problem 
affects  the  placement  of  the  party-in-the-electorate  in  the  political  map.  We  do  this  by 
comparing  our  VAA-based  map  with  one  based  on  data  from a  representative  telephone 
survey, namely the Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects) 2007. The Selects survey is particularly 
suited as it a) includes a series of 11 items on policy statements that are, if much less specific,  
essentially similar to the smartvote items; and b) was conducted over a roughly similar time 
frame. As in the VAA-based analysis, factor analysis and Mokken scaling of the 11 policy  
items led to the identification of an economic and a cultural dimension.22
Figure  5  plots  the  average  positions  of  respondents  (corrected  for  cantonal 
oversampling) who feel close to one of the five major Swiss parties along with the respective 
standard  deviations  on  the  two  dimensions.  We  can  clearly  see  that  the  basic  pattern  is 
analogous to the VAA-based map. Here too, the supporters of the Social Democrats, the FDP 
and the People’s Party form an ideological triangle with the CVP located right in the middle.  
At the same time, however, the supporters of the five major parties seem less distant from 
22  The  method  of  scale  construction  corresponds  to  the  one  described  above.  We  excluded 
respondents who indicated that they did not cast their vote in the federal election to get a sample of  
actual voters. As mentioned earlier (see footnote 5), a much higher number of respondents claimed 
to have voted than one would have expected when looking at the effective turnout rate. The data 
was weighted to correct for cantonal oversampling. The cultural dimension consists of five items on 
EU membership, immigration, the army, traditionalism, and law and order (H = .38). The economic 
dimension contains two items, one on social expenses and the other on taxation of high incomes (H 
= .34). Meanwhile, Mokken scaling yielded a third dimension on environmental protection, which 
we do not consider for our comparison with the VAA-based map. Factor as well as Mokken scale 
analysis results can be obtained upon request.  
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each  other.  This  could  indicate  some  problems  with  representativity:  it  is  widely 
acknowledged  that  voter  ideological  consistency  depends  on  a  voter’s  level  of  political 
sophistication, insofar as higher sophistication generally leads to more consistent, and thus 
also more polarized, views of party supporters (Converse 1964; Converse and Pierce 1986; 
Jennings  1992).  The  more  distant  average  supporter  positions  in  the  VAA map  could 
accordingly be the result of the self-selection mechanism, which leads to overrepresentation 
of sophisticated voters in the VAA sample. But, importantly, there are other factors that could 
be responsible for the comparatively lower spread in the survey-based map. On the one hand,  
the  survey  questions  include  a  middle  category,  whereas  the  VAA map  does  not.  The 
availability of a middle category could have tempted a number of respondents to choose the 
in-between answer instead of taking a clearer stance by opting for a tend to agree or disagree 
– which obviously will  result  in seemingly less  distant  positions.  On the other  hand,  the 
different format may also have contributed to a different spread. Respondents have more time 
to think about their responses in case of the VAA, which may induce more consistency; and 
the absence of an interviewer in case of VAAs may facilitate the expression of “difficult”  
positions, i.e., distinctively non-centrist positions. Overall, we should thus not be worried too 
much about the more distant placements.
However,  another  small  difference  concerns  the  position  of  the  Green  party 
supporters,  which in contrast  to the VAA-based map suggests that  they are slightly more  
socially liberal than the SP supporters. However, their positioning still remains very close. 
Probably the most significant difference concerns the placement of the FDP and the CVP on 
the y-dimension. While CVP supporters remain slightly more liberal than FDP supporters, 
both are now relatively closer to the conservative SVP. Given that both of these parties are  
disproportionately supported by elderly people and pensioners in particular, we cannot rule 
out the possibility of a sampling bias in the VAA data. Nevertheless, the difference is hardly  
fundamental. 
Turning  to  the  question  of  ideological  cohesion,  we  obtain  similar  results  to  the 
findings from the VAA-based map – despite the fact that the differences are less pronounced,  
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which could well be due to the significantly lower number of items. First, the supporters of  
the two left-liberal parties remain the most coherent, particularly on the economic dimension.  
Second, the SVP supporters remain close on the cultural dimension only. Moreover, as in the 
VAA-based map, the standard deviation on the y-axis is the smallest of all five. And lastly,  
FDP and CVP supporters  remain the most  divided overall.  With some smaller  caveats in 
mind, we thus think the VAA-based map passed the test of external validity.
Comparing Party Supporters and Candidates
Now that we have established the basic validity of the VAA-based political map, we 
proceed to more fully exploit the potential of VAA data and investigate additional aspects. In 
this section, we consider the relationship between rank-and-file supporters and the political 
elite,  link  our  findings  to  the  broader  literature,  as  well  as  compare  them with  previous 
empirical inquiries. For our comparison of party supporters and candidates, we exploit the 
fact that most candidates filled in the same questionnaire, i.e., we use the same items to place  
candidates within the demand side political map. It is important to note that we thus impose 
the latent political dimensions underlying the demand side of electoral competition on the 
supply side. Meanwhile, we are aware that that the dimensionality of the two sides need not  
be the same (cf. Lachat 2008). But the present endeavor of comparing the placements of the  
elite to those of party supporters necessarily requires a common scale. In full knowledge that  
a complete understanding involves considering both sides of the coin, for now, we will use the 
dimensions inferred from the demand side preferences.
Figure 6 presents the mean positions of both supporters and all candidates of the five 
major Swiss parties, as well as the respective standard deviations on the two dimensions. The 
first thing we note is the generally smaller size of the ellipses around the candidate positions,  
which  suggests  –  rather  unsurprisingly  –  that  politicians  tend  to  be  ideologically  more  
coherent. There are two minor exceptions, namely the CVP on the x- and the FDP on the y-
dimension, but given the roughly equal size of the candidate and user standard deviations, this 
does  not  change  the  overall  picture.  Meanwhile,  the  tendencies  in  terms  of  intra-party  
ideological consensus remain the same also for the supply side. 
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A more interesting question seems to be whether it is the elite or their followers who 
are  more  polarized.  Again,  we  can  glean  the  answer  from  Figure  6:  candidates  seem 
consistently more polarized, particularly on the economic axis. While the candidates of the 
left-liberal Social Democrats and Greens are stronger left-leaning than their constituencies 
(and also more socially liberal), the candidates of the CVP, FDP, and SVP have stronger pro-
market attitudes (and roughly similar cultural attitudes). 
Yet, the ideological distances between the elite and rank-and-file supporters seem to 
vary considerably by party. Table 4, showing the Euclidian distances between the stances of  
supporters and candidates, confirms this impression. The ideological gap is most pronounced 
in case of the left-liberal SP and the right-conservative SVP. Yet, it is notable that the very 
considerable ideological distance between SVP candidates and supporters is due mainly to the 
economic dimension. We have already established the existence of two distinct types of SVP 
supporters,  with  the  adherents  of  Kitschelt’s  winning  formula  on  one  side  and  those 
combining strong conservative attitudes with a more moderate stance on economic issues on 
the other. The position of the SVP candidates close to the bottom-right corner of the map 
suggests that the party elite is predominantly of the former type, i.e., has a rather extreme pro-
market ideology, and accordingly misrepresents a significant part of its constituency.
(Figure 6 about here)
Meanwhile, the gap between supporters and the elite is smaller for the Liberals, the 
Christian Democrats, as well as the Greens. In case of the former two, the smaller ideological  
distances may be explainable by the relatively centrist elite positioning on the cultural (both 
FDP and CVP) and the economic axis (CVP only). Since many voters tend to be located 
around the center, the moderate positions are likely to lead to a high degree of elite-supporter  
ideological congruency (Leimgruber et al.  2010). The closeness of the Green elite and its 
followers, on the other hand, may be due to the party’s status as a niche party.23 It is held that 
niche  parties,  unlike  their  mainstream  counterparts,  do  not  try  to  seek  short-term  vote  
maximization, but aim to preserve their existing constituency in the longer term. Niche parties 
23  A niche party is defined as a party belonging to the Communist, the Nationalist or the Green party 
families.
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tend thus to be more responsive to their voters, as it can be expected that they try to appeal to  
their electorate on policy grounds in order to maintain long-term loyalty (Ezrow, De Vries, 
Steenbergen,  and  Edwards 2011).  Moreover,  the non-hierarchical  structure  of  niche party 
organizations favors communication between the elites and party members (Kitschelt 1988),  
which renders the elite more responsive to member policy preferences. In sum, while the  
differences  in  intra-party  congruency we find  are  considerable,  they  seem explainable  in 
terms  of  existing  theoretical  accounts.  Maybe  even  more  importantly,  while  the  exact  
numbers differ,  Leimgruber et al. (2010) found an essentially similar pattern using survey 
data,  with  the  SP  and  SVP  most  distant  from  their  voters,  the  Greens  and  the  FDP 
significantly closer, and the CVP the closest. 
 Despite these inter-party differences, however, candidates of all parties remain quite  
distant  from their  constituencies,  and  party  supporters  are  much closer  together  than  the 
politicians. This finding is in line with the seminal work of Converse (1964), as well as with 
newer  work  in  the  US and the  French context,  respectively  (Converse  and Pierce  1986; 
Jennings 1992). In addition, it mirrors recent empirical work on the elite-mass ideological 
relationship in Switzerland (Lutz 2008; Leimgruber et al. 2010; for a contradicting finding cf.  
Lachat 2008). However, the higher level of polarization on the elite level is at odds with the  
traditional median voter theorem, which would lead us to expect that parties place themselves 
near the center of the political spectrum (Downs 1957), as well as with refined proximity 
models which predict that candidates in a multiparty system – aiming at vote maximization – 
place themselves near the center of attitudes of their electorate (Dalton 1985). Instead, the 
stronger elite polarization can be interpreted as support for a directional model of voting, 
which suggests that voters support a party that takes a more intense position on the side of an 
issue is more likely to be favored by the voter (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989; Iversen  
1994). As argued by Kedar (2005), choosing a party with more extreme values does make  
sense particularly in a consensual system like Switzerland where voters can expect that a  
party’s more extreme values will be watered down along the path.
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The notion of a directional model of voting is even strengthened when we look at 
individual candidates. In particular, the Euclidian distance between supporters and successful 
candidates for the National Council is consistently higher than the one between supporters 
and unsuccessful candidates (cf. table 4).24 This seems to confirm the rank-and-file preference 
for  more  extreme  representatives.  However,  there  are  at  least  two  other,  though  not 
necessarily rival, explanations for what we find: political sophistication and a socialization 
process. In order to understand either, we have to acknowledge that the bulk of the candidates 
on party lists are best described as space fillers without any reasonable chance to get elected.  
For instance, the CVP in Zurich – a mainly protestant canton where the originally catholic  
party is traditionally weak – presented their voters with a full list of 34 candidates as well as  
an additional  second list  with 23 candidates from the young CVP,  even though the CVP 
gained  only  two  seats  in  the  previous  election  in  2003.  It  is  thus  obvious  that  the  
overwhelming majority of candidates did not stand the slightest chance of being elected – not  
least in light of the fact that both incumbents aimed at re-election. Most of these space fillers 
do not  even actively campaign;  their  only function is  to fill  up the list.  Space fillers  are 
accordingly not (yet) part of the political elite, narrowly defined, but can rather be described  
as active party members that may at some point in the future may get the chance to run from a 
better list place. Thus, the continuum of ideological polarization could stem from the differing 
levels of political sophistication of normal party supporters, which arguably increases along 
the path from active party members to elected MPs. In fact, Leimgruber et al. (2010: 518) 
present some evidence in support of the sophistication thesis: according to their findings, the  
closest ideological relationship can be found between sophisticated voters and unsuccessful 
candidates.  However,  unfortunately,  our  dataset  does  not  contain  data  on  political 
sophistication to reassess this claim.
The  third  explanation  of  the  remote  positions  of  successful  candidates  is  closely 
related to the sophistication thesis,  but  refers to a socialization process, wherein potential  
future MPs learn in the course of climbing up the ladder of party hierarchy that, in order to be  
24  The elections to the National Council follow the proportional principle, whereas the elections to the 
State Council follow the majoritarian principle. By focusing on the bigger chamber, we aim to avert 
possible effects of the electoral system. 
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successful,  they need to have an ideologically  more pronounced position than the typical 
grassroots party member. Such a socialization process makes sense in the Swiss open list PR 
system  in  particular.  It  is  widely  acknowledged  that  open  list  systems  make  personal  
reputation  for  parliamentary  candidates  extremely  valuable  and  thus  create  incentives  to  
differentiate from the rest of the candidate field, for example, in ideological terms (Sartori  
1976; Carey and Shugart 1995).
Lastly, both the socialization and the sophistication hypotheses gain some leverage by 
the fact that incumbents running for re-election in the lower chamber consistently have the 
most  distant  position to the average party supporter,  notably more distant  than the newly  
elected,  whereby the newly elected  are  again more distant  compared  to  the  unsuccessful 
candidates (see Table 4). Put differently, the data seems to suggest an ideological continuum 
with  party  supporters  at  the  least  polarized  end  and  those  arguably  most  politically 
sophisticated and in the final stage of socialization, i.e., incumbent candidates, at the other  
extreme end.  Meanwhile,  we  have to  note  that  our  cross-sectional  snapshot  does  not,  of 
course, allow us to put any of these potential causes of the remote position of successful 
candidates  (directional  voting,  political  sophistication,  and  a  socialization  process)  to  an 
effective test. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that the differences are simply due, for 
example, to a lower degree of ideological thinking among the general populace (Jennings  
1992). Moreover, the tentative conclusions we have reached may also be due to ecological 
fallacy, i.e., could be the result from the usage of aggregate national data to infer individual-
level relationships.
Ideological Differences at the Sub-national Level
In the final section we will use the VAA data to address an ongoing debate on whether 
there is something like a national party in Switzerland at all. Ladner (2001) holds that the  
highly decentralized, federal structure has effectively hampered the rise of national parties.  
According to Ladner, there is thus nothing like a Swiss party system; instead, he claims, there 
effectively are 26 different party systems, i.e., one per canton. Implicit in this claim is the  
assumption that the ideological divergence between the sub-national parties (which form the 
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national parties) is sufficiently large as to render any attempt at national aggregation useless  
and  potentially  misleading.  However,  using  as  evidence  roll-call  votes  and  voting 
recommendation  in  referendum  campaigns,  Hug  (1994)  and  Hug  and  Schulz  (2007) 
demonstrate  empirical  evidence  that  disputes  the  view  that  regional  differences  render 
analyses at the national level impossible.
We  investigate  cross-cantonal  ideological  variation  on  both  the  demand  and  the 
supply side of electoral competition. However, due to the limited number of observations in  
many small cantons, we restrict our analysis to five cantons: Zurich, Bern, Lucerne, Vaud, and 
St.  Gallen.  Our  case  selection  aims  to  cover  differences  in  geography,  language,  and 
religion.25 Figures 7 and 8 plot the cantonal-specific average positions of party candidates and 
supporters26, respectively. We can indeed see some regional differences, and some of them 
seem systematic across the national party families. For instance, the cantonal parties from the 
catholic Lucerne and, though less consistently, St. Gallen tend generally to be at the right-
conservative end of the respective party spectrums. However, the most significant difference 
certainly concerns the Vaud. Both supporters and elites from the French-speaking canton tend 
to be located at the left-liberal wings of all major parties. In fact, the only exception is the  
Vaudois SVP supporters. The “Röstigraben” – the term is commonly used in Switzerland to 
refer  to  the  more  left-leaning  voting  behavior  of  the  French-speaking  part  in  certain 
referendum votes, especially votes on social policy – is thus reflected in the relative intra-
party ideological stances. Figure 8, where we plot the aggregate average positions of both 
users  and  candidates  from  the  German-  and  the  French-speaking  cantons  (multilingual 
cantons excluded), respectively, confirms this impression. 
Yet, are the differences so fundamental that they preclude national aggregation? This 
certainly does not seem to be the case for the demand side where the mean points of each  
party “cluster” (see Figure 8) do not overlap with the “clusters” of other parties―except in 
25  The Vaud is a French-speaking, protestant canton with a significant catholic minority located in the 
West; Bern is a predominantly protestant, multilingual, though mainly German-speaking, centrist  
canton;  Zurich  is  mainly  protestant,  centrally-located  and  German-speaking;  Lucerne  is  a 
traditionally  catholic,  German-speaking  centrist  canton;  and  St.  Gallen  is  a  German-speaking, 
religiously divided canton with a catholic majority in East Switzerland.
26  We again focused on candidates for the National Council.
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the  case  of  the  two  left-wing  parties,  which  are  always  seen  to  overlap.  However,  the 
supporter data suffers from a lack of representativeness; we may thus have more trust in the  
candidates data. The supply side shows a considerably higher degree of regional variation 
among cantonal parties, in particular for the CVP. Indeed, the cantonal CVP of both Lucerne 
and St. Gallen seem closer to the FDP than to the other cantonal CVP parties (see Figure 7). 
But still, apart from these two cases, based on the 2007 data set at hand cantonal parties all in 
all are closest to their own party families. Overall, we thus believe that regional differences do 
not  necessarily  render  national  aggregation flawed.  Whether  the relatively small  cantonal  
differences are the result of a gradually centralizing Swiss party system in general is beyond 
the scope of this exercise and cannot, in the end, be investigated with VAA data alone.
Conclusion
For the purpose of mapping ideological space in an electoral context, VAA data has 
the potential to overcome certainly not all but some of the major pitfalls of other methods  
such as expert coding or content analysis of party manifestos. While standard survey data can  
help to compensate for some of the problems involved, these surveys are, however, relatively  
costly, and therefore have to operate with sample sizes not large enough allowing for a more 
thorough analysis of population sub-groups or regional splits.
Like  in  many  other  established  Western  democracies  the  classical  cleavages  in 
Switzerland can nowadays be reduced to one left-right  and one cultural  liberalism versus  
conservatism axis, which emerge as two latent variables each composed of a set of policy 
statements  included  in  the  VAA.  Our  assessment  of  scalability  for  the  two  pre-defined 
ideological axes of the Swiss political space revealed problems regarding internal consistency. 
This we attempted to overcome by applying inductive approaches, namely, exploratory factor 
analysis based on polychoric correlations and Mokken scale analysis. In a first step the two-
dimensional  solution  was  confirmed;  however,  it  portrayed  some  peculiarities  for 
environmental  items,  and  also  led  us  to  exclude  several  ambiguous  items  from  further 
analysis.
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With the help of the two re-established uni-dimensional scales we were able to map 
the party supporters of the five biggest Swiss political parties during the 2007 Swiss elections.  
Findings from the VAA generated data sets are largely coherent when compared to survey 
data from SELECTS 2007. With a solidified mapping of party supporters as a baseline we 
were, in a next step, able to contrast their positions to those of the lower house candidates  
who had filled in the VAA questionnaire. Candidates are ideologically more coherent and 
seemed to take more pronounced positions than their supporters, especially on the left-right  
axis. The gap between the elite (candidates) and their constituents (VAA users) is largest for  
the parties at the poles of the political spectrum, the Social Democrats (SP) and the People's 
Democratic Party (SVP).
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Table 1: Polychoric Factor Analysis of the 63 Smartvote Items 
Item Question (shortened) Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness
1 Raising the pension age .008 -.501 .75 
2 Income-based health insurance premiums .313 .574 .572 
3 Alternative medicine covered by basic health insurance .26 .404 .77 
4 Limitation of the free choice of doctor .028 -.19 .96 
5 Free choice of 2nd pillar pension fund  .126 -.178 .952 
6 Federal subsidies for daycare centers .583 .304 .568 
7 Cut unemployment benefits -.348 -.427 .697 
8 Replacement of grants by repayable loans -.26 -.305 .84 
9 Special schools for troublesome children -.419 -.133 .807 
10 State subsidies for private schools .06 -.061 .993 
11 Ban on usage of genetically modified organisms  .122 .583 .646 
12 English as the first foreign language in school -.026 -.258 .933 
13 Communal right to vote for foreigners .766 .208 .37 
14 Right for asylum seekers to file a judicial appeal .709 .214 .452 
15 Collective residence permit for sans-papiers .659 .337 .452 
16 Restricted use of the ballot box to decide on naturalization .739 .107 .442 
17 More federal funds for integration of foreigners .623 .259 .545 
18 Gay adoption .523 .064 .723 
19 Ban of minarets -.777 .038 .394 
20 Legalizing cannabis .548 -.051 .697 
21 Legalizing active euthanasia .302 -.141 .889 
22 Federal ban on smoking in public buildings .072 .159 .97 
23 Check of parity of pay between men and women  .363 .582 .529 
24 Abolishment of fixed book prices -.057 -.537 .709 
25 Abortion .466 -.210 .738 
26 VAT reform .054 -.397 .839 
27 Tax equality between cantons and communes .247 .541 .646 
28 Ban of degressive tax rates .366 .485 .631 
29 Introducing individual taxation for married couples .322 -.15 .874 
30 Tax reform concerning commuters .308 .112 .893 
31 Reduction of federal taxation -.359 -.401 .71 
32 Replacement of federal taxes with higher VAT rates  -.064 -.302 .905 
33 Introduction of minimum wage of 3,500 francs .231 .621 .561 
34 Total liberalization of shopping hours .087 -.606 .625 
35 Permission of parallel imports .325 -.242 .836 
36 Privatization of Swisscom  .051 -.568 .675 
37 Maintaining a comprehensive network of post offices .066 .547 .697 
38 Mandatory funds for apprenticeship places .266 .569 .605 
39 Public contracts should favor Swiss companies -.338 .459 .675 
40 Introduction of road pricing .479 .259 .703 
41 Raising environmental standards for new buildings .379 .391 .704 
42 Relaxation of protection provisions for wolves -.324 -.167 .867 
43 Building new nuclear power stations -.431 -.562 .498 
44 Limitation of the associations right of appeal -.488 -.501 .511 
45 Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions .469 .461 .568 
46 Freezing of the construction zones .155 .468 .757 
47 Animal protection lawyer .226 .305 .856 
48 Financial referendum at federal level -.216 -.060 .95 
49 Direct election of the Federal Council -.297 .061 .908 
50 Right to vote from the age of 16 .529 .161 .695 
51 Fighting youth crime by tightening juvenile law -.608 -.191 .594 
52 Supporting role for the army in internal security -.289 -.136 .898 
53 Free choice between military and civilian service  .647 .173 .551 
54 Stricter monitoring of compliance with driving regulations .201 .319 .858 
55 Storage of military weapons in the armory .626 .208 .564 
56 Preventive monitoring of personal communication -.351 -.122 .862 
57 Abolishment of military courts .525 .04 .723 
58 Severer punishment for vandalism -.571 -.147 .652 
59 Foreign deployment of armed Swiss troops .367 -.169 .837 
60 Start of negotiations over EU membership .659 .131 .548 
61 Active and open foreign policy .719 .066 .479 
62 Extending free movement of peoples to Romania/Bulgaria .701 -.076 .503 
63 Facilitating agricultural imports from developing countries .507 -.233 .689 
% of variance explained 43.19 27.78  
Note: N = 7,887; the factor analysis is based on a polychoric correlation matrix; the loading matrix is varimax 
orthogonal rotated; loadings above .4 are in bold. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2: Mokken Scale Analysis on 52 Smartvote Items 
Item 
c > .3 c > .4 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 
1             
2   .4        .43  
3   .31          
4             
5             
9 .31            
10             
11        .31     
12             
13 .5        .53    
14 .46        .49    
16 .45        .49    
17 .41        .5    
18  .38        .4   
19 .46*        .45*    
20  .36           
21  .37        .41   
22             
23   .41        .45  
24    .32*         
25  .49        .52   
26             
27   .4        .43  
28   .32          
29             
30             
32             
33           .46  
34    .32*         
36    .35*         
37    .33         
38   .4        .45  
39      .34       
40     .36        
42             
46        .31     
48       .33      
49       .33      
50 .35            
51 .42*        .45*    
52             
53 .41        .41    
54     .36        
55 .39           .42 
56             
57 .3           .42 
58 .43*        .46*    
59             
60 .42        .46    
61 .44        .48    
62 .42        .47    
63      .34*       
Scale 
H .41 .39 .38 .33 .36 .34 .33 .31 .47 .44 .?? .42 
Note: N = 8,188; * item is reversed; items 6, 7, 8, 15, 31, 35, 41, 43, 44, 45, and 47 are excluded as they fit 
multiple scales. 
 
 
  
Table 3: Weights 
Left-Right   Liberalism-Conservatism 
Item Weight   Item Weight 
. 2 .195   .13 .17 
.23 .251   .14 .148 
.27 .196   .16 .117 
.33 .279   .17 .09 
.38 .234   .19* .142 
    .51* .109 
    .53 .073 
    .58* .088 
    .60 .106 
    .61 .127 
    .62 .107 
Note: N = 12,622; * item is reversed; weights determined by polychoric factor analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: Ideological Distances (Euclidian Distances) 
 
Euclidian Distance CVP FDP SVP SP GPS 
Supporters – Candidates (All) .13 .16 .28 .2 .16 
Supporters – Elected Candidates (NC) .23 .25 .36 .24 .21 
Supporters – Not Elected Candidates (NC) .11 .15 .26 .19 .16 
Supporters – Incumbent Candidates (NC) .28 .3 .38 .24 .24 
Supporters – Newly Elected Candidates (NC) .16 .15 .33 .22 .18 
Note: NC denotes that candidates for the National Council were considered only. Candidates running for both 
chambers were also excluded.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Internal Consistency of the Items on the Smartvote Left-right Scale (Restscore Method) 
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Figure 2:  Internal Consistency of the Items on the Smartvote Liberal-conservative Scale (Restscore Method) 
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Figure 3: Screeplot of Eigenvalues 
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Figure 4: Party Supporters within the Ideological Space 
 
Note: the (S) denotes party supporters.  
  
Figure 5: Party Supporters within the Ideological Space (SELECTS)
 
Note: the (S) denotes party supporters.  
  
Figure 6: Candidates vs. Party Supporters
 
Note: the (S) denotes party supporters; the (C) denotes candidates.  
  
Figure 7: Cross-cantonal Comparison (Candidates) 
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Figure 8: Cross-cantonal Comparison (Party Supporters) 
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Figure 9: Comparing Language Groups 
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